The New World: 21st Century Global Order and India

The author frames “order” not simply in terms of politics and power, but as the outcome of inventions, industries, and ideologies that have shaped human civilisation. His narrative blends the lens of an Indian scholar with that of a seasoned politician, tracing turning points in history and highlighting the roles of non-state actors, technological revolutions, and the moral and ethical dimensions of order.

A key merit of the book is its insistence that moral orders matter as much as political ones, and its willingness to critique the Western liberal order for being “core-country led” and overly centered on U.S. and European interests. Citing Amitav Acharya of American University, Washington among others, Madhav rightly contends that the problem lies not in liberal values themselves (e.g., justice), but in the selective, often self-serving application of those values by hegemonic powers. This moral critique resonates with broader Global South perspectives, though the book would have benefited from comparative insights into how other rising powers frame similar objections.

India’s position in this evolving order is the book’s main concern. In essence, Madav calls for a more realpolitik-inspired reimagining of India’s way to gain its prestigious place back in the world as a source of exceptional/unique civilisation, thereby a source of distinct ideas, solutions, and wisdom for the world’s problems. He argues that such vision is being reinvigorated under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. By extension, Madav calls for a united front in support of Modi’s governance and his foreign policy. The book’s civilisational emphasis is positioned not just as a matter of heritage pride, but as a strategic resource to differentiate India from both the West and other Asian powers.

Madhav roots India’s foreign policy under Modi in two principles: de-hyphenation (defining relationships based on India’s interests rather than third-party frameworks) and strategic autonomy (a combination of proactive diplomacy and national interest considerations). In practice, this has meant an attempt for an “omnipresent” diplomatic approach designed to maximise India’s agency in the world, a bold and unapologetic stance of defining India’s foreign relations purely from the national interests of India alone, and a call for domestic unity in support of its climb in the world order. Hence, India’s simultaneous deepening of ties with both the U.S. and Russia, as well as its active role in both the QUAD and the SCO groupings. However, the book does not fully address how these principles are operationalised in complex situations—such as balancing ties with both the U.S. and Russia during geopolitical and trade  crises, which have recently erupted — leaving readers with a conceptual rather than a practical roadmap.

Yet these positions invite pressing questions. Will India, by privileging pragmatism and national interest, step back from championing universal principles like human rights and the UN Charter, or even further, revisit its more globalist ideals, such as its no-nuclear-first-use policy? Would such a move erode its credibility when criticising other states’ violations of international law? Can it retain its image as a benign champion of the Global South while pursuing a realist, nationalist foreign policy rooted in what could perhaps be India’s own civilisational exceptionalism? And, as India’s GDP share grows and its ambitions rise, will its “proud pragmatism” translate into inclusive leadership, or into a more assertive and potentially divisive great power posture?

Madhav’s civilisational framing, with its emphasis on India’s unique heritage and ancient wisdom, could provide a diplomatic advantage in regions like ASEAN and Africa, where cultural links run deep, as he suggested. However, there is a risk that such exceptionalism—if overly romanticised—could shade into exclusionary nationalism, echoing the “shining city on a hill” rhetoric of past great powers. Rather than an entirely new source of wisdom from a different great power, some states may prefer to reform universal notions of freedom and liberal order to make them more inclusive, rather than abandon them altogether.

The question remains whether India will be seen as a benign leader in a fractured world, or as another ambitious power seeking to reshape the order in its own image.

The book’s strengths are also its weaknesses. While it captures the sense of discrimination and unfairness felt by many developing nations under Western-dominated orders, it offers limited clarity on whether India’s alternative would be rooted in universal values or in transactional interests. The vision of a multipolar world could just as easily produce competing “power centers” with client states as it could a genuinely representative system. Furthermore, the text occasionally gives stage to far-right or sectarian views without adequate critical counterbalance, particularly on issues of population control and demographic change—at times implicitly singling out the Muslim population.

Madhav’s admiration for Prime Minister Modi is evident and uncritical, especially when he juxtaposes it with discussion over symbolic aspects like the Sengol as a divine emblem of dharma-based authority. This absence of critique raises concerns about the book’s ability to engage objectively with the risks of concentrated power, both domestically and internationally. The romanticised image of “Brand Bharat” risks functioning less as a principled guide for foreign policy and more as a justification for unapologetic pursuit of national interest—comparable in spirit to slogans like “Make America Great Again.” An acknowledgment of internal debates within India on these issues could have provided a more balanced treatment.

Nevertheless, the book gestures toward constructive pathways. India could project its model of connectivity, infrastructure development, and technological R&D capacity, built over decades, as an exportable example. It could emphasise its civilisational principles of non-violence, renunciation, the inner life, and the role of women (making up India’s spirit or “Chiti”)—signalling a “Virat” or  showcase of great national strength – that could be benign abroad. Programs such as SAGAR^[1], which guide initiatives like maritime capacity and infrastructure-building in the greater region, such as among the Indian Ocean states, already demonstrate practical leadership beyond cultural diplomacy.

The New World succeeds as a provocative call to rethink the global order from an Indian perspective, weaving together history, political analysis, and civilisational pride. Yet it leaves unresolved the tension between India’s nationalist impulses and the universalist values it has historically championed. Whether India’s future leadership will be guided by contemplative gentleness or pragmatic calculus, and whether it will embrace moral responsibility alongside strategic ambition, remains an open question that the book, perhaps intentionally, does not answer.

Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma, is a Researcher at Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia.

This article was exclusively written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.